An Israeli navy inquiry into the collection of errors within the lead-up to and in the course of the Hamas-led assault of October 7, 2023, has acknowledged the military’s “full failure” to stop it.
In what investigators say was a extremely coordinated assault that took years of planning, teams of Hamas-led fighters broke out of Gaza and attacked Israeli communities and a music competition alongside the frontier.
In whole,1,139 folks died in the course of the assault and about 250 taken captive.
The report particulars a historical past of misconceptions in regards to the danger posed by Hamas and a refusal to simply accept warning indicators of an assault, in addition to the military’s incapacity to coordinate a response.
Whereas the report has laid naked most of the Israeli military failings on October 7, 2023, comparable investigations into the political failings have been repeatedly blocked by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his right-wing coalition.
How did Israel’s military underestimate Hamas?
The report says the military has a decades-long “basic misunderstanding” of Hamas, main senior officers to underestimate the group’s capabilities and intentions.
Army planners had assumed Hamas posed no important menace to Israel and that it was tired of a large-scale warfare, based on investigators.
Planners additionally believed Hamas’s tunnel networks had been considerably degraded, with any cross-border menace simply thwarted by Israel’s high-tech separation barrier.
Regardless of warning indicators, similar to uncommon actions by Hamas fighters, Israeli authorities insisted that the group was centered on sustaining governance inside Gaza and would assault Israel by rocket, relatively than a large-scale floor invasion.
In addition they misjudged Hamas chief Yahya Sinwar, assuming he was “not concerned about a wider warfare”.
What warning intelligence did Israel ignore earlier than the assault?
Within the hours main as much as the assault, the report stated, the Israeli navy both ignored or misinterpreted a number of indications that an assault was imminent.
On the night earlier than the assault, a number of feminine spotters alerted their commanders to uncommon exercise alongside the border. Moreover, officers reported the mass activation of Israeli SIM playing cards recognized to be within the palms of Hamas fighters, in addition to suspicious actions in Hamas’s rocket deployment;
Nonetheless, commanders as an alternative relied upon what they stated have been “reassuring indicators” that Hamas was merely conducting a navy train.
How did Israeli intelligence misread occasions?
Based on the report, Hamas started contemplating the October 2023 incursion as early as 2016.
Nonetheless, Israel’s intelligence neighborhood dismissed such experiences as “unrealistic”, believing Hamas to have been deterred by the Israeli response to the rebellion in Could 2021, when Israel killed 232 people in Gaza.
The Israeli military has since realised that Hamas had determined as early as April 2022 to launch its assault. By September of that 12 months, it was 85 % prepared and in Could 2023, it set October 7 because the date.
What have been the Israeli operational failures that day?
Many.
The military was unprepared for the assault, investigators discovered, and the deployment of troops was considerably delayed, permitting Palestinian fighters to push on with no rapid resistance.
In a single kibbutz, Nir Oz, which the military is accused of getting deserted, one survivor later instructed the Israeli chief of workers that the final Palestinian fighter had left lengthy earlier than the primary Israeli soldier entered.
Assessments of fighter numbers have been additionally discovered to be huge of the mark, with planners wildly underestimating the size of the assault.
It was later decided that 5,600 fighters crossed the border in three waves, backed by a barrage of some 4,000 rockets and 57 drones.
Because of this, Israel’s Gaza Division of somewhat greater than 700 troopers was overwhelmed and, for hours, remained “defeated” and navy planners have been unaware of that whereas coordinating their response.
It wasn’t till round 12pm [10:00 GMT], when reinforcements started to reach, that Gaza Division started to function.
The report additionally famous that the Israeli air drive struggled to differentiate between Hamas fighters and Israeli civilians. Whereas the report avoids going into particulars, the navy accepted some Israelis had been killed by pleasant hearth.
Simultaneous to the assault, investigators discovered, many plane have been deployed towards the properties of senior Hamas commanders in Gaza as an alternative of defending civilians and troopers below assault.
Did commanders order the Hannibal Directive?
Based on a number of Israeli newspapers, sure, and lots of civilians died consequently.
The Hannibal Directive, which orders that the Israeli navy to make use of all drive doable to stop Israeli combatants from being taken captive, together with killing anybody round them, was ordered in the course of the assault, the Israeli day by day, Haaretz reported.
As such, orders have been issued on October 7 for Israeli forces to stop Hamas from returning to Gaza with captives “in any respect prices” which included killing civilian non-combatants.
A few of the pilots flying over the battlefield have been reportedly unwilling to behave upon the Directive and from time to time held off from firing altogether, from concern about hitting civilians.
However, subsequent investigations have proven a number of civilians have been killed because of the Hannibal Directive.
One, Efrat Katz, was killed by helicopter hearth as she was being transported to Gaza by Hamas fighters.
In Kibbutz Be’eri, an Israeli tank fired two shells right into a home recognized to be holding over a dozen captives, together with 12-year-old twins. Solely two captives survived.
What are the important thing takeaways?
Earlier than the assault, key warnings, similar to elevated fighter exercise and intelligence experiences, have been both ignored or misinterpreted.
Assessments by the Israeli military underestimated the size of the assault, with poor communication and poor intelligence-sharing amongst commanders including to the failures
The Israeli military was gradual to reply to the Hamas-led assault and reinforcements have been too gradual in arriving.
No comparable investigation has been undertaken into the actions of the federal government earlier than and in the course of the assault.
